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THE ECONOMICS O F  PROTECTION AGAINST 
LOW PROBABI1,ITY EVENTS* / *' 
Howard Kunreuther 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a growing literature emerging in the social sciences on the 
failure of consumers to protect themselves against events which they perceive 
as having a relatively low probability of occurrence even though it may produce 
substantial damage to their property, cause them personal injury or perhaps 
even loss of life. In some cases, firms have also been reluctant to offer protec- 
tive options to individuals or they devote little effort to promoting these pro- 
ducts. 
T h e  following three examples illustrate these points 
*The research report in this paper is supported by the Bundesrninisterium fuer Forschung 
und Technologie,F.R.G., contract no. 321/7591 /RGB 8001. While support for this work is 
gratefully acknowledged, the views expressed are the author 's  and not necessarily shared by 
the  sponsor. 
**This paper reflects discussions with a number of individuals in the course of my work on 
decision processes for low probabiiity events. In particular, my thinking on many points has 
been clarified through interchanges with Baruch Fischhofl, Jack Hershey, Paul Kleindorfer, 
Sarah Lichtenstein, Mark Pauly, Paul Schoemaker, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky a s  well as 
with my IIASA colleagues John Lathrop, Joanne Linnerooth, Nino Majone, Michael Thompson 
and Peyton Young. 
(1) A li1r.g~. n ~ l n ~ b e r  of dr-ivers did nol voluntarily pbr.cha?cl aulnriioni!e 
insurance until they were required to  do so (Hcrnstein 1972). 'I'uday, 
mosl  s ta tes  in tile U.S. rezulate !,ales and I.t'tere have been charges of 
discrimination in the pricing and distribution of automobile insur.ance 
(Mac Avoy 1977). 
Flood insurance was not offered t o  U.S. residents in hazai-d-prone areas  
on a large-scnle !.eve! untii 1969 when a subsidized joiilt ft.cic.ra1-private 
1 program was initiated.- Even though the federal government higlhly 
subsidizes thc  premium, flew residents purchase policies today unless 
they a r e  required to  do s o  as  a condition for a new mortgage. Most 
insurance agents have aiso not encouraged their  pol icy-h~lders  to  pur- 
chase this coverage nor provided t.hem with. information on the availa- 
bility of t h s  insurance (Kunreuiher,  e t .  a1. 1976). 
(3) Seiatively few inciividuals vsluiltarily l%car seat bells even though they 
are aware that by doing so  they :vill reduce the  ct;nsequences of a n  
automobile accident. Firms have been reluctant to 1nsL~l1 air  bags in. 
automobiles even though surveys of crjnsurners suggest thai; the major- 
ity of drivers would be in favor of such action (Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety 1S80). 
Each cf t h ?  a b c v ~  exampies in6irat:-s the inability of the ~ r i v a t e  msrkc t  t n  
provide protection against low probability events. A princi.pa1 reason for sucn  
marke t  failures Is !nai cor~s~i rners  rlnd/or firms have lirnitcd i n i o r n ~ ~ t i o n  (;ti. 
botn the na tu re  of the hazards they face a s  wel! as  t h e  available protective 
options. 2 
This paper  systematically explores how different types of imperfect 07. par- 
tial ini'orlnatinn impact on consumer and firm interactions in the contexl of the  
above three examples. It also examines t.he effect of alternative prescriptive 
measures, such as incentive systems or government regulacionc on perfor- 
mance. Specifically, th.e following questions will be addressed: 
(1) i-iow do the declslon processes of consumers impact on the perfcr- 
mance of the market? What efiect do systematic biases and simplified 
decision rules nave on equilibrium price-quantity values? 
(2) How do firms and consumers update their information through learn- 
ing? What role does statistictrl data and personal experience play ia 
thz dynamics of the decision process? 
The next section of the paper details a framework of analysis and the 
relevent assumpticns. Sections IT1 through V illustrate the framework by consic!- 
ering each of the above three examples in turn. The concluding section sum- 
marizes ihe findings and suggests directions for future research.  
J i .  FRAMETrYGRK FOR iui.4LYSIS 
A. Relevant Assumptions 
The framework which guides thc analysis is presented in Figure i where the 
adjustment process and flow of information is depicted between the  two relevant 
parties-consumers and firms. To simplify the analysis assume that  there nre at 
most twc groups of consumers a t  risk, each of whom iaces a sirele loss 0,') 
which is correctly estimated. Consumers in group H have a reLatively high prc- 
bability ~f a loss, while those in group L have a relatively lo7v chance of a loss. 
A t  the end of poriod t ,  each group i has their own perception of the probability 
of a loss ( y U )  which may differ fzom the true probability ( 9 ~  ) i = L  , H .  Consumers 
base their estir;l.-te of iPil on some weighted average o: their previous estimate. 
Consumers may revise their estimate pit as t changes by inzorporatirg new data 
such as 2 recent experience with the  hazard. This updating process may occur 
even i f  the true probability. Q I G ,  remains stable over time. Unless specifically 
steted, *G is independent cf hurnzn action so there are  no problenls of moral 
hazard. 3 
Figure 1. Framework for Analysis 
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Firms set  their prices Pjr as a function of their ability to classify consumers 
and their perceptions of consumer demand ( Q ; ~ )  at different prices. If firms had 
perfect information on each individual's demand curve and its risk group then 
there would be only two p r i c e s a n e  for the high and low risk groups. Since i = j  
we specify demand and premiums in this situation as simply Qu and Pit i=L,H. 
The other extreme would be the case where the firm had no information on any 
consumer and set one price for both groups possibly based on misinformation 
regarding the true risk, a,, and the consumer's decision rule. If the firm 
charges only one price in period t to both risk groups, this will be denoted as Pt. 
In the three examples which follow, I am interested in exploring the nature 
of the  equilibrium between supply and demand a t  the end of any period t .  
Specifically, what prices are  charged for the protective measures? How are 
these prices affected by the type of information which firms and consumers 
have on the probability of a loss, the types of decision rules whlch consumers 
utilize, and firms perception of this behavior. What are  the welfare implications 
of these prices to high and low risk type consumers and how might government 
policy help rectify any imbalances? 
The resulting equilibrium will also depend upon the number of firms mark- 
eting the product and the degree of competition between them. We will consider 
two extreme cases: (a) the firm is a monopolist; and (b) the firm is in a com- 
petitive market where it is costless for new firms to enter  or exit from the indus- 
t ry and consumers have n o  search costs in obtaining data on premiums. These 
polar cases enable us to determine the sensitivity of information imperfections 
to market structure so as to understand more clearly when alternative policy 
prescriptions such as incentives and regulations may be desirable. 
B. An Illustrative Example 
To illustrate the above framework more concretely let us consider the case 
where both the consumer and firm have perfect information. The resulting 
equilibria in this ideal world can then be contrasted with the more realistic 
cases to be explored in the next three sections when the informational assump- 
tions for the firm and consumer are relaxed. For this example and later ones, 
graphcal  analysis and numerical examples will depict the resulting equilibria. 
Flgure 2 depicts a situation where consumers have the option of purchasing 
insurance to cover a portion or all of their loss of X dollars should a disaster 
occur. Firms offer coverage to  consumers in each risk group i a t  a price per 
unit coverage of Pil i=L,H. If the probability of a loss for each group remains 
stable over time, then so will the price of insurance. Consumers are  assumed to 
be averse to  risk, estimate the probability of a loss to be a,, and choose the 
optimal amount of insurance by maximizing expected utility. Then the demand 
curves for consumers in each risk group is given by D, i=L ,H, and full coverage 
will be purchased if Pir =au. Firms are assumed to know Qit as well as ail. If 
losses are not correlated between individuals, then it is realistic to postulate 
that in this ideal case firms will set their premiums so as to  maximize expected 
profits for each risk group which we denote as E(n i r ) .  
The equilibria for the two polar cases are also illustrated in Figure 2. When 
the lirm is a monopolist it will set the premiums at  PA so that each consumer 
purchases less than full coverage. In a purely competitive environment with 
Figure 2. Premium Structure for Monopolist and Competitive Firms 
with Perfect Information. 
costless entry or exit by firms, and no costs of search by consumers, the equili- 
brium price will be at  P,=iPd and E(n,,)=O i = L , H  for each firm in the industry. 
If a firm sets Pil < Q d  it will lose money; if Pi, > i P ,  then other firms can charge a 
price between Pit and i P i l ,  make positive profits and attract all consumers in risk 
group i. 
A numerical example depicted in Figure 3 illustrates the premium struc- 
ture for both the monopolist and purely competitive industry for the case where 
X=4O iPLI =. l  and iPHt =.3. Consumers all have the same utility function 
U i (  ~ ) = - e - ' '  with the risk aversion coefficient c=.O4. If the firm is a monopolist 
it will set pi; so as to maximize 
knowing that Qit is determined by each consumer maximizing his/her expected 
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Figure 3.  Illustrative Example of Premium Structure with Perfect Information 
utility. As shown in Figure 3 ,  the optimal premium structure in this case is 
pLt=.22 and ~ f i l = . 4 9  wnich results in gLt =:7.7 and QHt =1S.3 and yields expected 
profits of E(TILt)=2 and E(nHt )=3 .77  for the two reqect ive  risk groups. In a 
purely competitive lndustry the respective prices charged for the high and low 
risk groups will be the actuarial fair ra tes  of pLt=.i and ~ f ; ~ = . 3  and full 
insurance r i l l  be demanded s i n c ~ !  consumers a re  risk averse. By defimtion, 
expected profits for all firms in the industry will be zero. 
Let us now briefly tu rn  t o  the impact of market  s t ruc ture  on consumer wel- 
f a re .  It is clear from the  above example, and t rue  in general,  t ha t  competition 
improves the  welfare of each of the risk groups from what i t  would have been in 
a monopoly situation. The threa t  of new firms entering the marke t  forces each 
firm t o  se t  t he  lowest premium consistent with their information on the  risk and 
the  consumer's demand curve. In contrast ,  the monopolist can exploit his 
uniqueness by charging higher ra tes .  The question a s  to when regulation is 
appropriate for improving welfare thus h n g e s  on  the type of market  situation 
which consumers face. As we shall see in the next section, it also depends on 
information imperfections by firms. 
111. IMPERFECT4 INFORMATION BY FIRMS: THE CASE OF AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE 
A. Relevant Assumptions 
Suppose tha t  firms have imperfect information on the risk characteristics 
of consumers. A typical example would be firms marketing automobile 
insurance to drivers, some of whom may be considered to  be h g h  risk and oth- 
e r s  low risk. In the context of the above framework, these two categories reflect 
different probabilities of having an  accident. 
In this section we will consider the case where firms know what the proba- 
bilities a re  of a n  accident by a good or bad driver as  well as  the proportion of 
each type driver in the population. To focus on the impact of imperfect informa- 
tion by firms we assume tha t  consumers know whether they a re  good o r  bad 
drivers but a firm car-not classify any new applicant and hence is initially forced 
to charge a single premium.5 Over time the firm learns about the characteris- 
tics of its old customers t:hrough their loss experience. This information enables 
them to classify consumers through a Bayesian updating procedure and charge 
differential prices. The real-world counterpart of this behavior is the  common 
practice followed by insurance firms of "experience rating" whereby those with 
good driving records are charged lower premiums than those who have had 
accidents. 6 
The other institutional consideration which forms a part of this analysis is 
the differential information that  firms have on the characteristics of cor?sumers 
desirirg insurance. Insurance companies who obtain specific knosv!edge of their 
customers charazteristics through experience have no incentive to share this 
information with other firms. Hence these uninformed firms have no way of 
ccnfk-mily whether a new applicant is telling h m  the t ru th  about his past 
experience. 
Given the above assumptions we can examine the characteristics of the 
market and coctrast the resulting equilibrium with the ideal case discussed in 
the previous section. Let us s tar t  the analysis by first considering how premi- 
ums are set when firms have no information on the risk characteristics of the 
specific applicant. For concreteness we wi!l assume that  firms are  maximizing 
- 
expected profits and that consumers maximize expected utility. Similarly. firc.s 
are assumed -to utilize Bayesian updating procedures for incorporating loss 
experience into their classificatior! scheme. 
F~gure  4 graphically depicts the resulting prices in the initial period 0 for 
the nionopolist (P;)  and for a e r n  in a purely competitive industry ( p i )  using 
the  parameters from the previous example and assuming there are  ar! equal 
percentage of good and bad risks in the Turnirip first to the mono- 
polist, the contrast  with the case of perfect inforrnat~on is striking. Since the  
firm cannot dlstingulsh between the high and low risks, it finds tha t  the optimal 
price to charge is ~ ; = . 4 9 ,  a value so h g h  that  t he  low risk consumers will not 
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Figure 4. IlIustrative Example of Initial Premium Structure by Firm 
with Imperfect Information. 
demand any insurance. It is thus no coincidence tha t  the imtial price is the  
same as the premium charged to  high risk customers when the monopoly firm 
had perfect information. 
Ths particular example illustrates the phenomenon of adverse selection 
which has been discussed in the economics literature as a zause aI market 
failure (See Arrow 1963; and Akerlof 1970). In t h s  case adverse selection refers 
to the ability of the individuals at  greater risk to take advantage of the suppliers 
imperfect knowledge. Because a firm has imperfect information on the risk 
characteristics of potential customers, it charges a premium whch  is so high 
that  only the hghest  risk individuals demand coverage. 
Where there is costless exit and entry, then each firm in the industry sets a 
premium which yields zero expected profits as shown by ~ ; = . 2 5  in Figure 4. In 
this case the high risk individuals are offered insurance and naturally buy full 
coverage (i.e., QH=40 ). Low risk individual subsidize the h g h  risk group and 
hence purchase only partial coverage (QL=12). Compared to the case of perfect 
information illustrated in Figure 3, the h g h  risk individuals clearly gain at  the 
expense of low risk applicants. This phenomenon is a fairly general one in mark- 
ets  with imperfect information. Those who are  the worst risks get lumped 
together with better risks and hence benefit by not being identifiable as long as 
the equilibrium premium induces both groups to buy coverage. 8 
Let us now turn to the case where firms learn about the characteristics of 
their customers through loss data. During each time period an individual can 
suffer at  most one loss, which if it occurs will cause X dollars damage. This 
information is recorded on the insurer's record and a new premium is set for 
the next period which reflects h s  overall loss experience. Informed firms do not 
disclose their records to  other firms. lndividuals who are dissatisfied with their 
new premium can seek insurance elsewhere. Other firms will not have access t o  
the insured's record and hence cannot verify whether an applicant has had few 
or many losses under previous insurance contracts. Hence the uninformed 
firms just treat  the individual as a new customer. 
The premium structure for the informed firm is determined in the following 
way. Let period t be defined as the length of time a gr9up of customers has 
remained with the same firm. Then there will be t il different classifications 
reflecting the number of losses j ( j = O , i  . . . .  t j  d.uring this interval of time. Let Pjl 
represent the price charged to those consumers who have sul?ered exactly j 
losses in a t period interval. The premiums PjL , j = O  . . . t , have to be sufficiently 
low sa that  the uninformed firms cannct undercut these prices to at tract  custo- 
mers from the informed firm, and sti!l make a profit. 
A little reflection suggests the nature of the solution: as j increases then 
Pit will also increase, since the proportion of high risk consumers increases with 
j.  Hence, if an uninformed firm charges a ?remiurn less than Pjt it will a t t rac t  
all those customers with j or more losses. Hence, each premiam PjL must be 
sufF,cie~tly :ow sc; that  the uninformed firms cannot make a prcfit by attrezting 
cusiomers with j thru t l ~ s s e s . ~  Lct these valuer be designated as pjL.  In 
essence PjL represents En upper bound on the set 9f prices offered OD, the 
market .  If the informed firrr~ h d s  that it maximizes profits for any given 
classification j by setting pjL <PjL then, of course, it is in the firm's best 
economic interest to do so. Due to imperfect information by firms on the true 
risk, some of the high and low risk consumers will be misclassified OD_ the basis 
of their losses. Over time, these statistical errors will decrease as the popula- 
tion sorts itself into appropriate groups. 
E. An Illustrative Example 
Figure 5 illustrates the nature of the solution by considering a simple one 
period example ( i .e . ,  t =I) with two classifications based on j = G  or 1. Using the 
same parameters as in the previous problem (see Figure 3) we h d  that  the 
optimal premiums in the conlpetitive industry are P;,  =.29 and P i ,  =.25 ,  
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Figure 5. Premium Structure for Informed Firms 
at End of Period 1. 
yielding exper:ted profits of E (nil)=O and E (n;,)=.23 respectively. In the case of 
j = ! ,  tne resulting price ylelds zero profits because any P,,>.29 would have led 
an uninformed firm to set  a lower prics, induce all of those consumers with : 
loss to purchase from them while still making a profit. For j =0, the informed 
firm can exploit its information on losses and make a profit by charging the 
same premium that a new firm would charge if it could not distinguish between 
risk classes, pi1 = ~ ; = . 2 5 .  The informed firm estlrnates that the proportion of 
low risk customers with 0 losses is .56 rather than their initial estimate of .5 .  
This enables them to make a profit for customers with zero losses. 
The case of monopoly behavior over time is uninteresting for this example 
since the firm has se t  its initial premium so high that  only the  high risks will 
purchase insurance. Thus the premium remains stable over time unless there is 
a change in the estimated probability of a loss. Had the monopolist set a price 
where both high and low risk consumers purchased a policy then the updating 
procedure would have been identical to the one described above, except that  
j = 0  . . . .  t would be determined by maximizi% ~ ( 3 , ~ )  for eac5 classifization j 
since there would be no uninformed firms with whom to concern oneself. Prices 
v;ould thus be the same or higher than iil the competitive case. 
C. Welfare and Policy Imphc ations 
What are the welfare implications of the above analysis of firm imperfec- 
tions? Two principal points emerge. First, adverse selection may create a situa- 
tion where lcw risk individuhls will not  demand insurance because thr? pr2rnium 
is too high. Secondly, when both groups have coverage, low risk individuals will 
always subsisize high risk consumers whether or not they have an accident. 
Those who suffer a loss viill be misclassified into a higher rate zategory zs indi- 
cated by P I 1 .  Those wno do not suffer a loss will pay 2 lower premium than Pll 
but it will be above the actuarial rate because some high risk individuals will also 
be in t h s  category. 
The results of this dynamic model of learning have an interesting interpre- 
tation in the context of Cyert and March's (1963) study on the behavioral theory 
of the firm and Williamson's (1975) work on impacted information. Suppose we 
view policyholders as an integral part of the firm as in a mutual insurance com- 
pany where every insured individual is a member of the company. Any time 
there is a subsidy we can refer to this situation as one of orgaaizational slack. 
As defined by Cyert and March "slack consists in payments to members of the 
coalition in excess of what is required to maintain the organization" (p.  36.1 In 
!he context of t h s  exzmple, those in the highest risk class have no economic 
incentive to leave their insurance firm because their premiums are either 
actuarially fair or beicg subsidized. 
The low risk group has the reverse reactionall  the members are being 
charged more than the actuarial rat.e but other firms cannot distinguish their 
special status because of impacted information. They are thus forced to remain 
with their current firm because others i r l  the industry arz pot privy to the infor- 
mation on their relative risk. At the risk of generalization, we find that if firms 
do not have perfect information on their clients, insured individuals who are 
worse than ihe average will remain because of organizational slack while those 
who are better than average will not switch because of problems of impacted 
information. 
What are the implications of this behavior for prescriptive analysis? Obvi- 
ously public disclosure of the information that firms use to set their rates would 
benefit the low risk consumers at the expense of the higher risk group. Suppose 
drivers could present 2 certified copy of their accident record from Company A 
to a competitor. To the extent that t h s  option was pursued by cons!xners, 
impacted information would be reduced 2nd monopoly profits curtaiied. 
Monopoly profits by firms also provides some justification for regulzting 
insurance premiums. Ksny states currently have a prior approval regulatory 
system where justifications for rate increases must be filed with state insurance 
commissioners along with supporting documents.  According to  these laws ra tes  
a re  net  to be  excessive, inadequate or unfairly d lscr im~natory .  As in a!] ques- 
tions involving regulation one has to balance the  potential benefits of forclng 
firms to  reveal information with the paperwork and transaction costs involved in 
having the  company jus~ify eech rate  increase. More empirical da ta  is needed to  
provide a be t te r  da ta  base on whlch to  judgo these impacts .  The material 
reported in M ~ C P ~ V G ~  ;i977) is an  excellent s t a r t  in t k s  d i r e c t ~ o n .  
D. Future Research Questions 
Future research  on firm behavior can investigate the following se ts  of ques- 
tions in the context of t he  above framework. 
(1) What are the  implic2tions for market  behavior if firms utilize u p d a t i n ~  
procedures wh.ich differ from a Bayesian analysis? For example, sup- 
pose firms develop a ra te  classification scheme which only changes the  
premium if a driver incurs two or  more accidenrs in a given time 
period. Alternatively, suppose firms have or,!y 3 or 4 classifications no 
ma t t e r  how many periods the individual is insured with the firm. If 
consuniers have nc losses for a cer tain number of consecutive years ,  
they are  automatically placed in the  lowest risk classification. Hou- will 
these systems affect price and qclantity equilibria for the high and low 
risk groups? 
(2) Suppose one introduces search costs into the analysis so that  consu- 
mers  a re  reluctant to  seek out new companies unless their prer?' I 1ums 
increase from period t to  t + l  by more than  s dollars or z percent .  
What a re  the  implications of t h s  action on firm behavior as well as cn  
market  equilibrium values? 
(3) How does one incorporate equity considerations such as income level 
as well as societal concerns regarding discrimination by age or sex into 
thls analysis? There is considerable controversy now on this topic 
stimulated by the Massachusetts hearings on automobile insurance 
rates in 1977. 
(4) What are the likely differences to emerge between insurance premiums 
and the level of protection in states whch  are hghly regulated (e.g.,  
New Jersey) moderately regulated (e .g . ,  Texas) or rely on market 
forces (e.g.. ~alifornia).' '  An understanding of the decision processes 
utilized by firms and the  degree of imperfect information on charac- 
teristics of consumers are important factors to incorporate in the  
analysis of this comparative problem. 
(5) Finally, we have assumed throughout t h s  analysis that  consumers have 
perfect information on their own risk classification. What is the impact 
of different types of market or regulatory systems if consumers have 
misperceptions of their risk and behave in ways whch differ from max- 
imizing expected utility? T h s  very broad topic requires considerable 
research. The next section introduces some of the impacts of consu- 
mer imperfections on prices and market structure. 
N. IMPERFECT INFORMATION BY CONSUMERS: THE CASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE 
Let us now reverse the coin from the previous section by considering the  
case where firms have perfect information on the risk characteristics facing the 
consumer, but  individuals threatened with a loss of X dollars are  imperfectly 
informed of the risk which they face. An example of thls situation is the provi- 
sion of flood insurance to  residents of hazard-prone areas. Hydrologic data have 
been analyzed by groups such as the Corps of Enginers to determine the 
actuarial risk faced by different structures in the flood plain, but residents of 
the area may perceive the risk incorrectly. 
A. Misestimation of Probability 
To begin the analysis suppose that consumers misestimate the probability 
of a loss. There is considerable empirical evidence from recent  laboratory 
experiments supporting t h s  assumption. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
describe the biases and heuristics which cause systematic misestimates of pro- 
bability even by mathematically sophsticated individuals such as statisticians 
and engineers. They characterize one of these heuristics as availability whereby 
one judges the probability of an event by the ease with whch one is able to ima- 
gine it. In the  case of the flood hazard, two individuals with the same objective 
risk may estimate the probability of a future flood differently depending upon 
whether they have recently experienced a disaster. Fischhoff, Slovic, and 
Lichtenstein (in press) have categorized a set of biases in perceptions that indi- 
viduals exhibit with respect to low probability events. These findings are based 
on a series of laboratory experiments and field survey data which they and oth- 
ers have undertaken. 
B. An Illustrative Example 
What is the impact of such misestimation on equilibrium prices and demand 
for insurance protection. The simplest way to illustrate t h s  effect in the con- 
text of the previous example is to assume that  all individuals in the hazard- 
prone area have the same objective risk- aH, .  Some individuals in the group 
correctly perceive the probability of a disaster whle others underestimate its 
value, perceiving it to be aLt .  To isolate the effect of misperception of probabil- 
ity on market  adjustment processes, consumers are assumed to  choose the 
amount of protection whch  maximizes their expected utility. The demand 
curve for consumers who correctly estimate is designated by DHt. 
Those who incorrectly estimated the risk to  be p ~ :  =aLt have their demand curve 
given by DL:. Firms know the true probability, and the decision rule on which 
the consumer bases his decision. However, they cannot differentiate between 
consumers who correctly perceive the risk and those who do not. Hence, they 
set  just one premium P;' for the competitive situation and P; for the monopoly 
case. 
Figure 6 illustrates the  resulting equilibria for the case where aHt =.3 and 
some consumers correctly estimate its value while others assume p ~ , = . l .  In a 
competitive market the premium will always remain a t  p;'=aHt = .3  because any 
higher premium would induce firms to enter  the industry, charge a slightly 
lower price but one above .3 and still make a positive expected profit. Any lower 
premium would create losses. If consumers underestimate the probability of a 
disaster they will find t h s  premium to be relatively unattractive to them and 
purchase little insurance protection, in t h s  example Qu=6.2. In fact, i t  should 
be clear from t h s  analysis that  if the consumer sufficiently underestimates the 
chances of a fiood he may desire no insurance simply because the premium is 
too h g h  relative to the perceived utility of protecting himself. 1 1  
The monopolist wants to set h s  premium so he maximizes expected profits. 
If he assumes that  individuals correctly estimate the chances of a disaster then 
he sets  his price a t  pfrt=.49, the  same value as the one given in Figure 3 when 
both parties were assumed to have perfect information. In this case, those indi- 
viduals who misperceive the probability to be p ~ t = . 1  will purchase no coverage 
whle consumers with accurate information will buy ~fr:=19.3.  At the other end 
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Figure 6. Premium Structure with Imperfect Consumer Perceptions on QH. 
of the spectrum, the monopolist may assume that all individuals estimate 
( p H t  =.I. In this case he sets his premium so he maximizes profits given the 
demand curve DL; and chooses a value of ~ i = . 3 3 ,  thus eliciting a demand of 
@ i t = 3 . 1 .  Those who correctly estimate GHt will purchase 36 .9  umts of insurance. 
If the monopolist assumes that there is a fraction w who correctly estimates the 
probability and another fraction (l-w) who misestimate it then the premium, 
which maximizes expected profits, will be somewhere between .33 and .49. 
'l"lus simple example illustrates a somewhat obvious conclusion: even if the  
market is competitive with free entry and exit, individuals will purchase limited 
protection if they underestimate the risk. Firms will not set the premium below 
the actuarial rate unless they also underestimate the risk. Hence, the equili- 
brium price makes the purchase of a large amount of insurance relatively unat- 
tractive to those who perceive the risk to be smaller than it actually is. 
C. lrnpact of Behavioral Decision Rules 
The above model still assumes that  individuals are  behaving as if they max- 
imized some objective function such a s  expected utility. There is considerable 
empirical evidence whch  suggests that actual behavior of individuals regarding 
low probability events is based on a different decision process than the one 
described above. Building on the work of Herbert Simon one can hypothesize 
that  individuals' actions are constrained by their limited ability to  collect and 
process information. Hence they attempt. to satisfy some objective through the  
use of simplifying heuristics rather than optimizing behavior. One such heuris- 
tic w h c h  appears to explain protective behavior regarding low probability 
events is a threshold model of choice, whereby individuals do not concern them- 
selves with the consequences of an  event unless they perceive the  probability of 
its occurrence to be above a specified level p; (Slovic, et .  al. 1977). 
Field survey data of 3000 individuals in flood and earthquake prone areas, 
half of whom were insured and the  other half not, suggests that individuals util- 
ize a sequential model of choice in determining whether to purchase coverage or 
not, where a threshold probability is an  important part of the choice process 
(Kunreuther, et .  al. 1978). Unless individuals perceive the hazard to  be a serious 
problem and have engaged in discussions with friends and neighbors about 
insurance, they are  unlikely to buy coverage. The most important variable 
determining the perceived severity of the problem is past experience with the 
hazard, thus suggesting that the probability of the disaster occurring has been 
raised above some critical threshold pt'. Once the individual has decided that he 
is interested in protection, there is a tendency to utilize simplified decision 
rules whlch reflect human limitations in formulating and solving complex prob- 
lems. 
There has been considerable work in recent years to determine the process 
of choice once the individual has reached the stage where he/she  wants to bal- 
ance costs and benefits. For the single attribute problem discussed here where 
the tradeoffs are in monetary terms.12 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have for- 
mulated prospect theory as a n  alternative to utility theory. Thaler (1980) has 
also provided a number of examples illustrating the tendency of consumers to 
incorporate regret into their decisions and their failure to ignore sunk costs as 
part  of the analysis of a problem. 
The importance of accurately describing the factors influencing the  
consumer's demand curve for protection cannot be overemphasized. Unless one 
understands the process by which choices are  made, it will be difficult to evalu- 
ate how well the market is likely to work and the prescriptive alternatives which 
may be appropriate 
To be more concrete on t h s  point, suppose that the consumer has reached 
the stage in his sequential decision process whereby he is seriously interested in 
some protective mechanism such as insurance. There are several heuristics 
which appear to play a role in the final purchase decision. Rather than viewing 
the situation probabilistically, individuals may consider the cost of a policy in 
relation to the amount they are likely to collect should a disaster occur. This 
pr icenoss  ratio may explain the popularity of flight insurance where for a very 
small premium one can receive thousands of dollars worth of coverage. A com- 
ment from a homeowner in a flood-prone area illustrates how the perceptions of 
the premium in relation to the loss may be important, particularly after a past 
experience with the event. 
I've talked to the different ones that have been bombed out. 
Tbs  was their feeling: the $60 (in premiums) they could use 
for something else. But now they don't care if the figure was 
$600. They're going to take insurance because they have 
been through it twice and they've learned a lesson from it. 
(Kunreuther, e t .  al. 1978, p. 1 12). 
Another factor whch influences the decision on tahng protective action is the 
price itself. If the premium is above some critical level then this will discourage 
the purchase of coverage even if the risk is perceived to be bgh .  In trying to 
understand the impact of an income or budget constraint on coverage one unin- 
sured homeowner in a flood-prone area noted: 
A blue-collar worker doesn't just run up there with $200 (the 
insurance premium) and buy a pollcy. The world knows that 
90 percent of us live from payday to payday . . .  He can't come 
up with that much cash all of a sudden and turn around and 
meet all his other obligations (Kunreuther, et.  al. 1978, 
p.113). 
A final factor whch may determine how much protection an  individual is 
likely to purchase is the tendency to view t h s  expenditure as an investment 
rather than a contingent claim. In other words, the person wants to purchase 
insurance if he feels that he has a good chance of obtaining some return on his 
investment. This may explain the great popularity of first doIlar coverage and 
the preference for low deductibles on the part of individuals.13 It also is related 
to the concept of regret utiIized by Thaler (1980) as an explanation for this 
behavior. Once an uninsured individual has experienced a disaster he may 
regret not having purchased a policy. His natural response is to protect hmself 
against future events by purchasing a large amount of coverage. The same 
phenomena also explains why individuals cancel their insurance'policy after not 
collecting on it after a few years: they regret having made an investment which 
has not paid off. 
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Figure 7. Example of Premium Structure with Behavioral Consumer Decision 
Rules. 
A simple schematic model illustrating how the above heuristics could be 
incorporated into a demand curve for insurance is depicted in Figure 7 for per- 
sons whose threshold probability is above P;. As in the previous example, we 
assume there is only one risk, + H t ,  but that there are two groups of consumers: 
A 
those who correctly perceive the risk with demand curve DHt, and those who 
4 
incorrectly perceive it to be +Lt with demand curve DLt. Once the premium is 
above some critical upper limit (Ptmax), it is assumed there will be no interest in 
insurance by either group of consumers because of a budget constraint. If 
Pt =Ptm", an individual is likely to buy a relatively large amount of coverage 
because of concerns of regret  and h s  view of insurance as  a good investment. 
As the  premium decreases he will increase coverage until the premium/loss 
ratio is sufficiently low tha t  he wants to purchase full protection. We have 
denoted this lower bound as plm'". Both Ptmax and ptAn are  assumed to be 
independent of the probability of a disaster since they are influenced by factors 
such as budget constraints or premium/loss ratios. According to the above dis- 
cussion the following factors appear to influence the  shape of the demand curve 
for each risk group i: 
A. p u l p :  pu ( threshold  concept ) 
P~ 2 plmax Qu = O  (budge t  c o n s t r a i n t s )  
pth<pu <ptmax O <  at <X ( p r e m i u m  / loss  / ra t io  cons idera t ions )  
PU pt* Qit = X ( s u f f i c i e n t l y  low  p r e m i u m  / 1 oss  r a t i o  ) 
Let us now turn to the supply side. Firms have an  additional problem in 
marketing coverage against a disaster such as a flood where damages between 
individuals are highly correlated. They must concern themselves with the possi- 
bility of a catastrophc loss which may have adverse consequences on their 
financial stability and short-run operations. There are  two principal ways in 
which they can protect themselves against t h s  possibility: (1) they can only 
offer coverage to a maximum number of consumers a t  a fixed premium per dol- 
lar of protection, or (2) they can purchase reinsurance to cover the loss above a 
certain amount and can charge a premium per dollar coverage whch  increases 
as the  amount of coverage increases. Ths  type of premium schedule reflects 
risk aversion on the part  of the firm and the need to reinsure a portion of the 
loss. 
We have depicted the latter situation in Figure 7 for both the competitive 
and monopoly firms. The upward sloping supply curves, s;' and s;, reflect the 
case where firms are risk averse and concerned with possible catastrophe 
losses. Consumers who underestimate the probability of a disaster will thus pay 
a lower premium then those who correctly estimate the risk because they will 
be demanding less coverage. In the case of a competitive industry the optimal 
premiums and quantity pairs will be ! P i  QL;] ,  and !P; Q& for the individuals 
who underestimate and correctly estimate their losses respectively. We have 
drawn the monopolist's supply schedule St' to illustrate a case where both those 
who underestimate the risk and those who correctly estimate i P H f  will purchase 
the same amount Q;' at  the premium Ppu. The upward sloping supply curve 
discourages consumers from buying more than that quantity of insurance. 
D. Welfare and Policy Implementation 
This simple analysis has only h n t e d  a t  the dynamics of the problem by sug- 
gesting how people's perceptions of the probability of an  event may change over 
time due to past experience. From the welfare point of view, it is clear that con- 
sumers will purchase limited, if any, protection when they underestimate the 
chances of an  event occurring. After a disaster they may regret not having pur- 
chased insurance and may revise their e z  post estimate of the probability 
upwards. Ths  type of reaction raises an important phlosophcal  problem 
regarding the role of the private and public sectors in dealing with situations 
where there is wide diversity between ez ante and e z  post estimates of the pro- 
bability of an event occurring. 
The h s t o r y  of disaster relief illustrates this point rather clearly. Most indi- 
viduals in flood and earthquake prone areas have not protected themselves 
against these hazards with insurance because they perceived that the chances 
of an  event were so small that they did not have to  worry about the conse- 
quences. Little attention was given prior to the disaster by uninsured individu- 
als to the possibility of receiving federal relief to  aid them in their recovery. 
After the event victims pressured their Congressmen for special relief and new 
legislation was frequently passed providing people with generous aid. For exam- 
ple, Tropical Storm Agnes in June 1972 caused over $750 million worth of dam- 
age t o  private housing but only 1583 claims totaling approximately $5 million 
were paid under the National Flood Insurance Program. As a result, the federal 
government offered victims 85,000 forgiveness grants and 1 percent loans for 
the remaining portion of their loss (Kunreuther 1973). After the event victims 
may increase their subjective probability of the reoccurrence of t h s  type of 
disaster. However, liberal relief may have had the effect of discouraging some 
victims from voluntarily purchasing flood insurance in the future. 
There are  a set  of policy-related questions which are stimulated by t h s  e z  
a n t e / e z  post question. Specifically, can one make individuals more aware of the 
risks associated with a particular hazard so that they will want to  voluntary pro- 
tect themselves by focusing on the factors w hch  influence their demand for pro- 
tection? One way to encourage individuals to purchase insurance is to present 
information so that people perceive the probability of an  event occurring to be 
above their critical threshold level .  For example, in describing the chances of a 
100 year flood, the insurance firm or agent could note that for someone living in 
a house for 25 years the chances of suffering a loss a t  least once will be .22. 
Consumers may then be will~ng to view the situation as serious, where they 
would not if data was presented in terms of the annual probability of a flood. By 
presenting the same information in different forms or contexts people may 
behave differently.14 If  the principal reason for not purchasing coverage is the 
unusually h g h  price in relation to an income or budget constraint then a reduc- 
tion in the premium may be deemed desirable. 
The appropriate prescriptive measures depend on the market situation. If 
firms have some degree of monopoly power, premium regulation may induce 
more consumers to purchase coverage. In the case of flood insurance, where 
the industry had not offered coverage because of previous catastrophc losses, 
some form of government reinsurance may induce them to market policies a t  
premiums reflecting risk. In addition, some type of federal subsidy on premi- 
ums may encourage residents to buy coverage, although the experience of the 
National Flood Insurance Program is not encouraging in t h s  regard. 
If none of these incentives are successful and the public sector wants to 
reduce its financial commitments after a disaster, then some form of requred 
coverage may be necessary. The simplest policy would be for banks and finan- 
cial institutions to require insurance as a condition for  a mortgage as a way of 
protecting their own investments. An alternative to the above recommendations 
is for the federal government to provide relief t o  disaster victims, using tax- 
payers money to finance this effort. Ths  latter action explicitly assumes that  
disasters are a public rather than a private responsibility. 
E. Future Research Questions 
From the point of view of future research, the following questions need to 
be investigated to gain a better understanding of the interaction between firms 
and consumers: 
How can learning be more explicitly incorporated into an analysis of 
consumer demand over time? A protective mechanism can be viewed 
as an  innovation which takes time to be adopted by large segments of 
the population. The &ffusion process may be very important because 
of the impact that social norms may have on individual behavior. 
Schelling (1978) has treated t h s  phenomenon in some detail and pro- 
vides a number of interesting examples illustrating stable and unstable 
equilibria. 
(2). How is firm behavior affected by changes in the demand curve of con- 
sumers over time because of past experience and personal influence? 
Both these factors appear to play an important role in impacting on 
the decision process over time. 
(3) What impact do concepts such as regret, threshold behavior and consu- 
mer misperceptions have on market behavior and equilibrium price 
and quantities? 
(4) What are the e z  a n t e / e z  p o s t  implications of alternative market and 
public sector solutions? What are the appropriate roles of the public 
and private sectors with respect to protective activities and recovery 
measures after a disaster? 
V. ALL OR NOTHING PROTECTIW MEASURES (THE CASE OF AIR BAGS IN AUTO- 
MOBILE S) 
A. Relevant Assumptions 
There is a whole class of additional protective measures where the consu- 
mer normally only makes a "purchase" or "not purchase" decision. Some items 
protect against property damage such as the installation of a burglar alarm or a 
sprinkler system. Others involve the possibility of reducing personal injury or 
saving ones life such as  inoculations, wearing safety belts or buying an automo- 
bile with an air bag installed. 
These types of protective activities differ from insurance in two principal 
ways. The demand curve for the product is discontinuous a t  a critical price P*. 
A price above P* will cause the individual not to invest in the protective activity; 
if the price is a t  or below P* he will adopt the measure. The product is normally 
offered by a supplier other than an  insurance company since i t  involves costs of 
production. Hence it is possible to encourage consumers to purchase these pro- 
tective mechanisms by making the level of insurance premiums or the magni- 
tude of reimbursable claims after an  accident conditional on whether the meas- 
ure is adopted. 
For example, in many countries in Europe those who have an accident and 
are  not wearing their seat belts are able to claim only a portion of their insured 
loss. Tlxs penalty may encourage some drivers and passengers to wear seat 
belts. Similar incentives could be offered to consumers with respect  to  a reduc- 
tion in theft insurance premiums if they install a burglar alarm, a reduction in 
fire insurance rates if the property has a sprinkler system, or  lower health 
insurance premiums if they avail themselves of protective measures such as 
vaccines or  medical check-ups. 
In this section we will focus on the decision by consumers and manufactur- 
e r s  as to whether they should have air bags installed in cars. This type of pro- 
tective mechanism explicitly introduces the concept of human lives into the pic- 
ture.  It also has been in the news recently since the U.S. Congress is debating 
whether to require automobile manufacturers to install air bags in future new 
cars .  15 
To begin the analysis, assume that a driver faces a single loss X w h c h  in 
this case is a severe personal injury. If h s  car  does not contain an air bag then 
the probability of this disaster is given by iPH. Should he decide to purchase a 
car with an air bag then this probability is reduced to iPL. In contrast to the ear- 
lier problems which involve tangible estimates of property damage, the consu- 
mer is now faced with the more &fficult problem of estimating the value of a 
human life. 16 
Suppose that the consumer is a utility maximizer and thus incorporates the 
consequences, X, as part of his decision process. How would he determine 
whether or not to purchase a car with an air bag? The tradeoffs for this problem 
are as follows: there is an additional cost of the air bag, whch is labeled P, that 
has to be contrasted with the reduction in the probability of an accident during 
a specified period of time, in this case the life of the car.'? As Cook and Graham 
(1977) have shown there is a close parallel between the decision to invest in such 
a protective activity and the purchase of insurance. 
For the purposes of this exposition assume that t is treated as the same 
length of time as an insurance policy so the analogy with the previous example 
holds. In this case one can trace out a curve showing the "willingness to pay" for 
an air bag as a function of the reduction in the probability of an accident. One 
simply finds the value of P where the utility of no protection exactly equals the 
utility of protection. 
B. An Illustrative Example 
F~gure 8 depicts the "willingness to pay" curve for the same parameters as 
in the prototype example: X=40, iPH=.3, iPL=.l, so that the reduction in the 
probability of an accident is .2. As before the utility function of the consumer is 
Ui=-e-w where c =.04. As seen in Figure 8, the consumer is willing to pay as 
much as ~ * = 1 1 . 2  for protection even though the expected loss (i.e., the fair 
insurance premium) is (iPH-QL) X=B. Cook and Graham refer to t h s  difference 
of 3.2  as the pure protection benefit of the investment in air bags. It is the 
amount of money over and above the fair insurance premium necessary to com- 
pensate the individual for his life. 
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Figure 8. Willingness-to-Pay Curve as a Function of Reduction 
in Probability of Accident. 
In t h s  example, this differential is due to the  degree of risk aversion of the 
individual since one has already defined the "value of a life" to be X=40. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that  one had information that  an  individual would 
pay as  much as P* for an  air bag based on certain estimates of ( p H  and 9~ as well 
as a known utility function. Then one could use the same analysis to determine 
the value of X where this person would be indifferent between buying and not 
buying protection. This could then be interpreted as a "value of human life". 
The above analysis enables us to determine how misinformation on the  risk 
impacts on the maximum an individual is "willing to pay" for protection. If, for 
example, (PH=,3 and GL=.2,  then a person will pay no more than P=5 for instal- 
ling an air bag.' Thus if consumers undervalue the benefits of protection due to 
imperfect information they will have a lower critical value P* for determining 
whether or not they will avail themselves of protection. 
There may be more serious problems than misinformation on probabilities 
wbch  discourage the purchase of protective mechanisms. As indicated in the 
previous section, individuals are likely to use a set  of simplifying heuristics 
which will have an important impact on their decision process. A critical thres- 
hold, for example, where consumers ignore the consequences of an  accident if 
they feel the probability of its occurrence is less than P* would cause a group of 
consumers no t  to  even consider the option of buying air bags, no mat ter  how 
hlgh they valued their life. Those who did not consider protective options 
because of budge t  c o n s t ~ a i n t s  would be influenced solely by the price of the pro- 
duct rather than the benefits and cost tradeoffs depicted in Figure 0 .  Finally, if 
the  decision was made on the basis of a p r e m i u m A o s s  r a t i o  then air bags should 
look extremely attractive at  even a h g h  price if the consumer interpreted the  
loss to be the saving of his life. The actual decision process by consumers is 
likely to be based on some combination of the above types of heuristics coupled 
with exogenous factors such as past experience (in this case, previous car 
accidents) and discussions with friends and neighbors. 
C. Welfare and Policy lmplic ations 
What are the welfare and policy implications of different prescriptive meas- 
ures for dealing with the apparent lack of interest in air bags by both consumers 
and automobile manufacturers? As in the flood insurance example, consumers 
should be provided with accurate information on the value and costs of these 
devices. Frequently individuals focus on the negative aspects of protective 
mechanisms without adequately understanding its advantages. 18 
T h s  problem is exacerbated if there are conflicting views among interested 
parties revealing disagreement among experts. For example, in March 1980, 
Reader's Digest published an  article on "Who Needs Air Bags?", w h c h  hghlighted 
the deficiency of air bags--that it protects occupants in frontal crashes and not 
in side or rollover crashes without pointing out tha t  occupant restraints of any 
kind play only a secondary role in these types of crashes. In a letter to the 
Reader's Digest, Joan Claybrook, head of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), pointed out these misrepresentations but the damage 
in negative publicity for these devices may already have been done. Automobile 
manufacturers and dealers have voiced their concern about air bags by claiming 
that  their installation would increase product liability claims because occupants 
would charge that  the device was inflated too soon, too late, or not a t  all in a 
crash. The NHTSA claimed this was not the case (Claybrook 1980). 
The insurance mechanism could help resolve this above controversy. If 
insurance firms are  willing to  provide product liability coverage to automobile 
companies against lawsuits from charges tha t  air bags are defective, then this 
provides a n  economic barometer of the expected risk and costs of the malfunc- 
tioning of thls protective measure. On the demand side, consumers can be 
informed of the potential benefits of air bags by a lower insurance premium on 
their automobile policies. Today at least one insurance company offers a 30 
percent reduction in premiums on medical payments, no-fault or extended 
benefits coverages if a person has an automatic seat belt (i.e., seat/shoulder 
belts that automatically restrain you when the door is closed) or an air bag. 
Whether the dollar savings in premium is sufficiently attractive to the consumer 
to induce her to voluntarily purchase a car with an air bag is an open question 
wbch should be investigated. 
If one evaluates the welfare implications of alternative prescriptive meas- 
ures, the question of e z  a n t e / e z  post valuations rears it head again. Kleindorfer 
and Kunreuther (1960) present an example illustrating the impact of misinfor- 
mation by considering two alternative policies-mandatory vs. optional installa- 
tion of air bags by car manufacturers. Suppose that a consumer underesti- 
mates the probability of a dangerous accident or its consequences on an e z  a n t e  
basis so that he is not willing to incur the extra costs of protection. Further- 
more assume that only after an accident does the individual learn about the real 
advantages of air bags and the probability of severe accidents. On the basis of 
these data and his past experience he is now willing to pay considerably more 
for t h s  protection than before. 
The proposed regulatory standards requiring the installation of air bags in 
cars implicitly assume that consumers underestimate the chances and conse- 
quences of car accidents and hence do not demand automatic protection. 
Requirements that all new cars be equipped with air bags reflects the feeling 
that consumers would prefer to have someone else make the decision on protec- 
tion for them. Such a requirement would also penalize those drivers who regu- 
larly wear a seat belt and do not want to pay the extra money for having an air 
bag installed in their car. Whether t h s  type of action is an appropriate step is 
thus likely to  produce different reactions by interested parties. 
A recent survey commissioned by the N. Y. Times clearly reveals the type of 
conficts likely to emerge. In response to a question "Would you favor or oppose 
requiring car manufacturers to equip all new cars with air safety bags?" approxi- 
mately 45% of licensed drivers favored the regulation, 32% were opposed. When 
retail automobile dealers were asked the same question 93% were opposed to 
such a requirement (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 1980). If these 
results are indicative of the general population of consumers and suppliers then 
this suggests that market mechanisms are not likely to encourage manufactur- 
ers to  install air bags and that  economic incentive systems such as insurance 
premiums should supplement regulations to encourage consumers to protect 
themselves against these low probability-high consequence events. 
D. Future Research Questions 
The following broad research questions present themselves here: 
(1) How do consumers evaluate protective measures whch  affect their 
personal lives? Do they behave differently with respect to these 
actions than in their insurance decisions against personal property 
losses? 
(2) What are the decision processes which firms utilize in introducing new 
protective innovations where there is no tangible return to the consu- 
mer  unless an accident occurs? 
(3) What is the role of incentives and regulatory actions when there are 
conflicts among the interested parties and there may be differences 
between e z  a n t e / e z  post views of the situation? 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
m s  paper began by citing three examples where empirical data revealed 
that the market did not provide consumers with adequate or equitable protec- 
tion against low probability events. The analysis which followed revealed that 
markets do not perform well In these cases because of information imperfec- 
tions by consumers and/or firms. 
In the case of automobile insurance firms frequently use experience rating 
to differentiate between drivers with hfferent loss records. This process enables 
them to make monopoly profits because other firms do not have access to this 
information. The inability of firms to classify drivers with perfect accuracy also 
means that low risk individuals subsidize those in the h g h  risk group. 
In the case of flood insurance consumers have not voluntarily purchased 
hghly subsidized rates because they either underestimate the probability of a 
loss and/or they utilize decision processes which rely on factors other than 
tradeoffs between costs and benefits. As a result the public sector has provided 
uninsured victims with liberal relief following a catastrophe disaster. 
The air bag example shows that consumers may not demand protection 
against accidents whch may involve serious injury or loss of life because they 
are more concerned with the cost of protection rather than evaluating the 
potential benefits of reducing the chances of a severe accident. Similarly auto- 
mobile manufacturers and dealers prefer to maintain the status quo rather than 
adding protective features to their product wbch will raise its price. 
Proposed prescriptive measures for coping with the problems of protection 
against low probability events should address these descriptive findings. What is 
the role of presenting information to consumers so they better appreciate why 
one may want to take preventive measures before a disaster occurs rather than 
regretting not having done so after it is too late? Are there economic incentives 
which can  aid in this process? What is the appropriate place of regulation in 
coping with problems of marke t  failure? 
There a r e  no easy answers t o  these questions. What has  become clear is 
tha t  people do not do a good job in collecting and processing information 
regarding low probability-high consequence events. We must  accept  this empiri- 
cal observation and incorporate it into our theory. This paper  represents  a 
small s t e p  in t h s  direction. Considerably more work is needed in the future. 
NOTES 
1. The early history of flood insurance sheds some light on the reasons why 
companies have been reluctant to  market policies. In 1897 an  insurance 
company in Illinois offered flood coverage to property owners residing along 
the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. Two severe floods in 1899 created 
catas t rophc losses for the company, even washng away the home office. In 
the mid-1920's some insurance companies again attempted to market flood 
policies but severe floodmg in 1927 and 1928 discouraged all responsible 
companies from continuing this coverage (Manes, 1938, p.161). 
2.  The theme of imperfect information and its effects on individual and market  
behavior has played an important role in recent literature in economics 
(Arrow 1963; Akerlof 1970;; Williamson 1975; and Thaler 1980), as well as in 
psychology (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 
1977; Slovic 1978; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Einhorn and Hogarth 1981). 
3. For a more detailed discussion of the problems of moral hazard and its 
impact on insurance purchase decisions see Shave11 (1979). 
4. The material in this section summarizes recent research by Mark Pauly and 
myself. A more detailed discussion appears in Kunreuther and Pauly 
(1980). 
5. The above problem has been examined by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), 
Spence (1978) and others in the context of static market equilibrium. 
These analyses assume that f r m s  market price-quantity pairs of insurance 
contracts as a way of differentiating between high and low risks in contrast 
to the assumption here, similar to Pauly (1974), that firms set  a price per 
unit of coverage without restricting the amount which any group can pur- 
chase. 
6. A more detailed description of the practice of experience rating followed by 
firms in the U.S. appears in a detailed report of current practices by the 
insurance industry undertaken by the Stanford Research Institute (1976). 
7. Thls assumption is equivalent to assigning an equal weight to the h g h  and 
low risk groups in computing expected profit so that a meaningful com- 
parison can be made with Figure 3. If the high risk group has a larger rela- 
tive weight, then the resulting premium will also be higher. 
8. The low risk group could have had such a small probability of an accident 
that its demand for insurance could have shifted sufficiently downward that 
the only premium yielding zero expected profits would have been at  
Po11=.30. In this case the h g h  risk group would pay the actuarially fair 
premium and the low risk group would not have demanded any coverage, a 
case of adverse selection. 
9. Consumers are assumed not to have any search costs. If they had, then 
informed firms could capitalize on this transaction cost by charging even 
bgher  premiums than the ones specified above. 
10. See MacAvoy (1977) for a description of the different types of regulatory 
systems and comparisons of the performance of the insurance industry in a 
h h l y  regulated state (e.g., New Jersey) and one in which open competition 
prevails (e.g., California). 
11. Consumers who overestimate iPHt will purchase full coverage since they per- 
ceive the premium to be subsidized. 
12. It is interesting to speculate whether protective decisions are viewed by 
individuals as having multiple attributes such as reducing anxiety, social 
norms, in addition to monetary tradeoffs. The sequential model of choice 
suggests one way of dealing with t h s  problem. An alternative approach 
would be the method of preference trees proposed by Tversky and Sattath 
(1979) for describing the purchase of consumption goods such as automo- 
biles or choosing a meal in a restaurant. 
m s  e z  a n t e  behavior on the part of consumers is particularly interesting in 
hght of the reluctance by victims to collect on a policy if the loss is rela- 
tively small. For example, an individual with a $50 deductible who suffers a 
$75 loss from an  automobile accident may be reluctant to collect the $25 
because of the processing costs as well as the fear that h s  insurance rates 
will be raised the next year. I t  would be interesting to confront h m  with 
t b s  action and inquire why he did not initially take out a $100 deductible or 
whether he plans to do this on renewing h s  policy. 
14. Empirical evidence on t b s  point respect to insurance decisions and other 
choices under risk has been presented in a number of recent studies 
including Payne (1976); Fischhoff, Slovic, and hchtenstein ( 1976); Grether 
and Plott (1979); Schoemaker and Kunreuther (1979); Hershey, and 
Schoernaker (1960); Schoemaker (1980) and Tversky and Kahneman (in 
press). 
15. Proposed Congressional legislation would have required air bags in all large 
cars starting with the 1982 model year; the standard would have been 
extended to medium-sized cars in 1983 and small cars  in 1984. This bill was 
defeated during the summer of 1980 so that the future status of air bags in 
cars is in doubt. 
16. The problem is formulated in t h s  way for consistency with the earlier 
example and the literature on the value of human life (see Linnerooth 
1979). An alternative is to assume that  the probability of an accident 
remains the same but that the consequences are reduced from a h g h  loss 
XH (e.g.,  loss of life) to a lower loss, XL (e.g., some cuts and bruises). 
17. To avoid complicating the analysis assume that the consumer intends to 
keep the car  for its entire lifetime. Alternatively one can assume that  the 
resale or salvage value of the car  is independent of the installation of the 
air bag. Should the air bag have any intrinsic value at the time of selling a 
car  t h s  amount appropriately discounted would be subtracted from P in 
determining the cost of t h s  protective measure. 
18. In Holland, for example, many drivers refuse to wear seat belts because of a 
concern with being trapped in their cars  should it accidentally be pushed or 
driven into a canal. 
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